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I
Curbs upon restrictive agreements among independent firms and curbs upon
restrictive behavior of single enterprises were coupled at the inception of the
American antitrust policy. The Sherman Act1 forbids not only contracts in
restraint of trade and conspiracies to monopolize but also monopolization by single
firms. In early decisions the courts made no sharp distinction between the two
categories of restraint. Indeed, since the principles of the common law from which
the antitrust policy drew its ideas had been intended primarily to protect opportuni-
ties to do business, there was no logical reason to distinguish frustration of such
opportunities by a single enterprise from similar frustration of them by a group.
So far as the early formulations of antitrust policy were affected by economic theory,
a distinction between individual conduct and group conduct was equally inappropri-
ate. Economists used the term monopoly to mean a degree of concentrated control
so great as to give decisive power whether that power was possessed by a single
enterprise or by a group of enterprises acting in concert. A single standard of
appraisal was applied in economics as it tended to be in the law.
The divergencies between the treatment of groups and single firms that soon
developed in the application of the Sherman Act were due not to differences in
standards of evaluation but to differences in the feasibility of applying these standards
to different patterns of restriction. Agreements are usually explicit. Their content
is separate from the portions of business activity that are not subjects of agreement.
Agreements are deliberately made, and their purposes are stated or can readily be
inferred from their terms. Monopolization, however, is a pattern of power, purpose,
and conduct that has no segregated identity. It must be perceived in the size and
structure of the firm and the way the firm does business. Since some categories of
agreements are dearly restrictive, they can be considered unlawful per se. No
equivalent category of per se monopolization can be devised.
The significance of the difference is apparent in considering questions as to the
effectiveness of the two types of restriction. If the parties to an agreement contend
that it does not restrain trade because the contemplated restrictions are thwarted by
0 A.B. 192o, B. Jour. 1921, University of Missouri; B. Litt. 1924, Oxford University; Ph.D. 1928,
Cornell University. Professor of Economics, University of Oregon. Author, MAINTAINING COMPETITION
(1949); BIG BUSINESS AND THE POLICY OF COMPETITION (1955); THE PRICE DISCRIMI-1NATION LAW
(1959).
26 Stat. 2o9 (i890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
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the countervailing activities of nonparticipants the argument can be disregarded on
the common-sense ground that people do not trouble to enter into and abide by
undertakings that achieve nothing. No similar brush-off can be given to a single
firm's contention that it cannot restrain trade because it lacks monopoly power.
Even a firm that produces ioo per cent of the available supply may lack monopoly
power: it may be the last survivor of a dying industry or the first-comer into a field
that can be and will be entered with no difficulty by numerous others.
Similarly, where there are claims that restriction is beneficial, appraisal and appro-
priate action are easier in the case of agreements than in the case of monopolization.
Being explicit and separate, an agreement can be modified to eliminate from it what
is found to be restrictive in purpose without destroying what is nonrestrictive or
such of the restrictions as are merely ancillary to a proper purpose. Moreover, where
the entire agreement is struck down, the participating firms remain intact, free to find
ways of accomplishing their nonrestrictive purposes by individual action. In the
case of monopolization, appropriate correctives are harder to devise. If a powerful
firm's conduct has beneficial aspects, they are hard to disentangle from its restrictive
activities; for what a firm does tends to be blended into a coherent whole, which, in
a powerful firm, expresses its power. Dissolution of a monopoly, or even substantial
reduction of its power, changes the firm and thus may alter all aspects of its conduct
whether restrictive or not. The effect of the change upon the firm's desirable
activities will be sometimes clearly bad and often problematical. Those who enforce
the law may have only the choice of forbidding or permitting some blend of re-
strictions and nonrestrictive activities.
Because of these characteristics of the problem, the law about monopolization
differs from the law about restrictive agreements in spite of identity in the under-
lying meaning of restriction. Agreements are appraised by their content, not by
the impact derived from their coverage of a market. Firms with no preponderant
place in total sales are forbidden to take collective action to fix prices, restrict
output, or boycott outsiders. A single firm that covers the same portion of total
sales may set its own prices, restrict its own output, or withhold its goods from
whomever it chooses. As Europeans have correctly commented, the discrepancy in
the application of the law tends to encourage the establishment of unitary large
enterprises instead of cartels.
In a crude analysis, such a differentiation between single-firm and multi-firm
monopoly is likely to be regarded as merely formal. According to this view, a single
firm, curbed by its rivals, has incentives to engage in restrictions only where it has
attained a monopoly position. Similarly, it is argued that, while groups of firms
have pervasive incentives to avoid competition, they in fact cannot and will not
combine by agreement unless collectively they too have a monopoly position.
Though lesser restrictive agreements are theoretically forbidden, they will appear
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only by miscalculation and will disappear promptly whether they are unlawful
or not.
The insufficiency of such an analysis is made evident by observation. In Europe,
where laws allow considerable scope for cartelization, agreements by firms that do
not collectively monopolize their kind of business activity are common and often
are not ephemeral. In the United States, large enterprises that do not monopolize
their fields of activity exercise significant degrees of discretion in their price policies,
their policies as to levels of output, and their choice of customers. Restriction with-
out preponderant monopoly power is apparently possible.
II
Though economic theorists have given little attention to the phenomenon of
the nondominant cartel, they have developed sophisticated explanations for re-
strictive behavior by firms that have not attained monopoly. The theory of oligopoly
recognizes that, in a market consisting of a few firms, independent decisions by
each firm, expressing a desire to avoid retaliatory competitive action, may have
results similar to those of a restrictive agreement. Theories of imperfect competition
recognize that by differentiating products, taking advantage of such natural obstacles
to full competition as exist in actual markets, and introducing further obstacles,
firms can resort in significant degree to restrictive action. These theories conceive
the interaction of business enterprises as a blend of competition and monopoly in a
proportion that varies with the environment. Unfortunately, the theorists have
developed little that is useful in identifying the degree of restriction that needs
corrective public action. Indeed, by insisting that there are restrictive elements
in the conduct of any corner grocery, they have blurred the previously clear dis-
tinction between firms that manifest these elements sufficiently to express decisive
power and firms that do not have such power.2
If the Sherman Act had been written after the United States became aware of
the importance of oligopoly, of product differentiation, and of imperfectly competi-
tive markets, its concepts of market power probably would have been formulated
more comprehensively. In the corresponding European legislation of the post-war
period, single firms are subjected in several countries to some degree of surveillance
and control when they are "dominant" or have "substantial influence." Such a
degree of power is often attributed to firms that possess substantial but not pre-
ponderant market shares, size substantially larger than others with whom they com-
pete or deal, and products that have attained an exceptional degree of differentiated
prestige. Consequently, the requisite degree of power is often attributed to more
than one firm in a given industry. In these countries, control of the conduct of
single firms tends to cover oligopolists as well as monopolists.
I in this paper the term monopoly will continue to have the older meaning, and other terms will be
used for firms that have smaller amounts of power.
468 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Since the Sherman Act antedates public awareness of the importance of re-
strictions by single firms that fall short of monopoly power, its application to such
firms has been limited. Ingenious efforts have been made to use it against them.
Concepts of restrictive agreement have been broadened to the extent that agreement
has been inferred from similar action where there had been a prior exchange of
views3 or where each actor acted because he knew that others were doing likewise.4
Extensions of the concept of conspiracy have eroded the difference between overt
agreement and independent decision by each oligopolist in the light of what his
rivals are likely to do. Concepts of monopolization have also been broadened, and
monopoly has been attributed to firms that control a segregable part of a marketO
and even to firms that control dealings with a single important customer.0 The
Sherman Act is applied to more oligopolistic behavior than its authors would have
thought possible.
Nevertheless, most of the restrictive activities of powerful oligopolists have
remained immune from antitrust control. In significant portions of the parts of
the economy that such firms dominate, prices have been unresponsive to environ-
mental change or have displayed a ratchet-like capacity to move upward but not
downward 7 Similarities and identities in the conduct of ostensible competitors have
persisted not only where they were explicable as manifestations of competition but
also where they were not. In significant industrial fields, rates of business activity
and employment rather than prices have borne the principal impact of environ-
mental change even when the level of prices was so high that leading firms could
make profits while operating at half their capacity or less.'
Much of the ability that might have been used to compete in costs and prices
has been diverted to strategies designed to avoid such competition or to take ad-
vantage of its absence. Some of these have been useful to the economy, techno-
logical innovation and product development being the most obvious. Others,
however, have consisted chiefly of manipulative use of power to the detriment of
the buyer.
Large firms that eschewed price competition have used product differentiation
and planned obsolescence not only where response to varying tastes and evolving
technology made such practices appropriate but also where functionally meaningless
diversity of products would blunt the edge of competition. Expenditures by large
'Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d xooo (9th Cir. 1965).
A Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 3o6 U.S. 2o8 (1939).
5 Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
8 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
"See J. M. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNs€AIc PROCESS 434 (1961).
' See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
88T CONG., isr SESS., ADMINISTERED PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY 223-24 (Comm.
Print 1963); STAFF'OF SUBCOiMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
85ii CONG., 2D SESS., ADMINISTERED PRICES: AU'TOMOBILES 112-15; (Comm. Print x958).
CONTROL OF THE SINGLv Fii m
firms on promotional activity have become more elaborate and more costly, so much
so as often to jeopardize small competitors.1 ° Significant parts of these expenditures
have been used to enhance the authority of suppliers over their distributors"l and
to finance the development and use of new ways to exploit the ignorance and
gullibility of consumers. Particularly, they have been used to persuade buyers of
the importance of functionally meaningless product differentiation and fancifica-
tion. '2 A mixture of activities-from innovations in products and processes to
deliberate impairment of the durability and comparability of simple commodities,
from informative advertising to misleading assertion and deceptive packaging-
has been described as "nonprice competition." Firms engaged in it have argued that
it is an adequate substitute for price competition.' 3 Where the substitution has
taken place as an expression of the power of powerful firms but without collusion
among them, the antitrust laws have not been adequate to prevent it.
A possible public policy would be to supplement the antitrust laws by legislation
designed to cope with the restrictive activities of powerful firms by regulatory
controls. Since the second World War some European countries have imposed
such controls upon large firms as to prices and selection of customers. Denmark
requires influential firms to obtain the government's consent before raising their
prices. France requires large and small firms alike to sell to all buyers who seek in
good faith to enter into normal transactions. Several countries apply more modest
statutes that express similar policies. 4 Even in the United States, proposals have
been recurrently made to Congress that large firms be required to give the govern-
ment advance notice of price increasesj'
A second possible policy would be to modify the antitrust laws, by new legisla-
tion or by interpretation of the old, so that they would rest upon a distinction
9 These expenditures have differed in magnitude from one industry to another. In 1963, according
to Advertising Age, Aug. 31, 1964, p. 36, General Motors Corp. spent upon advertising S16o million,
about i% of sales; Procter & Gamble Co., $2oo million, over io% of sales; Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
$74 million, nearly 22% of sales; Bristol-Myers CO., $76 million, nearly 40% of sales; and American
Home Products Corp., $70 million, over 12% of sales. Larger percentage expenditures are undertaken
for products that are sold frequently in small quantities to ill-informed buyers.
20 See, e.g., Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.)
7358 (D. Hawaii, Sept. 24, x964).
'" Producers that engage in intensive sales effort directed at consumers can sometimes, so far as the
law allows, prescribe the equipment and much of the conduct of their distributors, confine each to a
prescribed territory, fix resale prices, and require that no competing distributor's goods be carried.
Examples have been numerous in the distribution of gasoline.
1  Sec Es'rs KE I'uvER, IN A FEw HANDs: MONOPOLY PowER IN AMERICA 93-103 (1965).
1 See, for example, Hearings on Administered Prices Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 2681-99, 2769-86
(1958).
"The policies of particular countries are discussed in my forthcoming book, TRADE REGULAToIo
OvERsEAs: THE NATIONAL LAWs, now in process of publication, and are analyzed comparatively in a
second book, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MoNoPoLIEs: AN INTERNATIONAL ComPARATIvE ANALYSIS, the
manuscript of which I have just finished.
t5 See, for example, Hearings on Administered Prices Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 85 th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. i, at 5o-5x (1957) (state-
ment of John Kenneth Galbraith).
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between types of business conduct that are believed to contribute to desirable
economic activity and types that have no such significance. Such a distinction
sometimes influences judicial decrees. Because both types of conduct are affected
when a monopoly is dissolved by law, judges deciding cases involving monopoliza-
tion have sometimes curtailed remedial action lest efficiency be impaired."6 Some
economists and lawyers are now asserting that this proper exercise of judicial dis-
cretion in determining the scope of a remedy should be converted into a dis-
cretionary standard of legality-that conduct thought to be desirable should there-
fore be held to be lawful.17 Thus far, this reinterpretation has been designed to relax
existing law, not to extend it to cover what it does not now reach. But the logical
corollary of such a policy would be that business conduct should also be unlawful
when it is considered undesirable-that the test of legality should be not restraint
of trade or effect on competition but efficiency in supplying economic needs. Under
such a policy, a government could take corrective action against inflexible prices,
high prices, functionless product differentiation, planned obsolescence, extravagant
fancification of products, wasteful packaging, wasteful advertising, or any other type
of business behavior it thought detrimental to an efficient economy. Pervasive
regulation would replace the policy of maintaining competition.
The inadequacy of antitrust policy in coping with restrictive conduct by powerful
firms might be reduced in a way more consistent with American antitrust policy
by reducing the size and increasing the number of firms to a degree sufficient to
restore the vitality of the price competition that is dead or has become anemic.
Where feasible, this would be the simplest and most effective way of achieving the
"'E.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., rio F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. i953), afJ'd per
leriam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
", See, e.g., Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust; Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: 1; and
Bowman, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: 11, in The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM.
L. Ray. 363, 401, 417 (1965). These articles presume that reduction of competition should be deemed to
be the equivalent of reduction of efficiency. This is made particularly clear in the discussion of incipiency
in the first article (id. at 368-69), in the contrast drawn between "efficiencies" and "restraints" in the
second article (id. at 409-12), and in the following passage from the second article: "To the degree
that the law is consumer-oriented, the question of efficiency-the ability of the economic system to
produce and distribute goods and services as inexpensively as possible-is fundamental. Efficiencies
depend upon a wide variety of technical, managerial, financial, and organizational factors, however,
and many of them are not susceptible of direct study and measurement. This means that the decision
of most cases must be accomplished by the use of presumptions created with the guidance of economic
analysis. . . . Analysis seems to indicate that vertical and conglomerate mergers are capable of creating
efficiencies and incapable of impairing competition. The strong presumption should, therefore, be in
favor of their legality." Id. at 409-1o. The sentence about vertical and conglomerate mergers probably
means "capable of creating efficiencies and therefore incapable of impairing competition." True,
this is not said. But it is implied in that (a) neither article ever considers the case, crucial for
the authors' argument, in which restraint of competition and increase of efficiency go together; (b)
in criticizing (id. at 369-70) passages in Judge Learned Hand's decision in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1945), that contrast (i) systems of production in which,
"in spite of possible cost," units "can effectively compete with each other" with (i) systems in which
those engaged "must accept the direction of a few," the first article ignores the restrictive implications of
the language used and focuses upon its cost implications; and (c) the second article is a reply to one by
Professors Harlan M. Blake and William K. Jones which argues that the goal of the antitrust laws is
preservation of self-adjusting competitive markets.
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desired end. Politically, such a course of action would be difficult because it would
arouse the simultaneous opposition of all large enterprises. Economically, it would
involve the transitional costs that are inevitable in any substantial reorganization of
industry. Moreover, by implying that a firm that grows big must suffer dissolution,
it might dampen the desire to grow, which is one of the healthiest of competitive
incentives. But, by restoration of self-regulating competitive markets, it would
relieve both business and government of the heavy burdens and hard choices that
are inevitable in government control of business conduct. It may be the only course
consistent with long-run minimization of the role of government in controlling the
operation of a private-enterprise economy.
Such a policy is not feasible, except at prohibitive social cost, where economies of
scale have thrust bigness upon business enterprise. Doubtless there are such cases,
but nobody knows how numerous and important they are. The big firms, which
alone possess the information that is relevant to an appraisal of their relative
efficiency, do not disclose it. Instead, they persistently offer self-serving assertions
that they are big because they are efficient. The government has not obtained and
analyzed the information requisite to an informed opinion on the point. The rele-
vant fragmentary studies, public and private, contain indications that the obviously
important technological economies of scale can be attained by firms of a size much
smaller than the largest;"8 but as to other types of economy they are inconclusive
and in some respects contradictory. Moreover, such information and analysis as are
available pertain almost wholly to the size of a big firm in a particular market
or industry horizontally conceived. The vertical and conglomerate reach of large
enterprises remains unmeasured 19 and its relation to efficient performance un-
analyzed. Nevertheless, the inevitability of big business on grounds of efficiency
has been so widely taken for granted as to deprive of serious political attention the
few proposals that have been made for comprehensive dissolution of big firms.20
III
Instead of basing policy toward big business upon a determination to keep the
structure of business appropriate to the operation of self-regulating markets to the
fullest extent that is feasible, the United States began in 1914 to experiment with
" See JoE S. BmN, INDusrsuAL ORGANIZATION 342-56 (1958).
" The only available measures, those that compare the assets of groups of large manufacturing firms
with aggregates for all manufacturing, fuse together the horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate di-
mensions of the firms. Attainment of a larger share of an important industry, extension across more
successive stages of operation, and coverage of more numerous lines of activity have identical effects
upon the apparent concentration.
"Ile foremost of these, which appeared in 1959, is CARL KAYSEN & DoNALD F. TURNER, AN rmusT
PoLicY. See also GEoRGE W. STOcxiNG & MYRoN WATiuNS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRIsE 563-64
(1951); JoE S. BmN, INDusTRIAL ORGANrzATIoN 6O8-i0 (1958); CoxwiN D. EowARns, MAINTAINIo
Co, pnrr'zoN 124-32 (1949); and Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. x, at 248-52, 353-78
(1964) (testimony of Walter Adams) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Economic Concentration].
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laws designed to keep the conduct of large enterprises consistent with what is
expected from competitors.2' The experiment was double-barreled. The Clayton
Act22 was a precautionary effort to stop monopoly "in its incipiency" (a) by for-
bidding certain practices so far as they were likely to impair competition-price
discrimination, exclusive dealing, and tying-and (b) by forbidding certain
methods of increasing business concentration-interlocking directorates and acquisi-
tions of stock in competitors. The activities covered were those that, in Sherman
Act cases, had seemed to have contributed most significantly to the development
of monopolies. The Federal Trade Commission Act 23 was an effort both to preserve
competition and to regulate the quality thereof. The unfair methods of competition
that it forbade were conceived partly as practices by which competitors were
deprived of access to markets or of freedom of action therein and partly as practices
otherwise undesirable. They included not only exclusionary, coercive, and col-
lusive activities but also misrepresentation, bribery, and inequitable conduct that
was damaging to competitors.
In subsequent legislation, the Congress extended the equitable reach of these
laws. By the Wheeler-Lea Amendment24 business practices were brought under
the Federal Trade Commission Act not only when they were unfair to competitors
but also when they were unfair to consumers. By the Robinson-Patman Act,2 1 the
price discrimination provisions of the Clayton Act were so amended as to forbid
discriminatory practices not only when market competition was likely to be impaired
thereby but also when inequitable treatment was likely to impair the opportunities
of certain enterprises26
That equitable control of conduct has a proper place in government policy is
axiomatic to most men. It is questioned chiefly by scholars who take economic
models so seriously as to believe that the only valid social goal is to maximize the
productivity of the economy, that the institutions of property and contract accurately
translate social product and social cost into pecuniary pluses and minuses, and that
in spite of market imperfections the pursuit of gain leads everyone to do what is
socially most desirable. To the rest of us it is obvious that competition, desirable
though it is, does not necessarily prevent child labor, protect the health and safety of
the working population, eliminate racial discrimination in employment and in sell-
21 In the Sherman Act attempts to monopolize, as well as monopolization, had been forbidden. The
prohibition was applicable, however, only where the purpose was clear, and, prior to the legislation
of 1914, such a purpose was unlikely to be perceived unless monopolization was imminent. Thus the
precautionary control of conduct reached little that was immune from the prohibition of monopoliza-
tion.
2'38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S§ 12-27 (1964).
2338 Stat. 717 (94), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S§ 41-46, 47-58 (1964).
2452 Stat. II (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 4 el seq. (958).
2549 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 33 13-13b, 2ia (1964).
" An equitable basis has also appeared in certain other commercial laws. For example, in the
Automobile Dealer Franchise Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 1125 (956), 15 U.S.C. S§ 1221-25 (1964), auto-
mobile dealers were given protection against practices by automobile manufacturers that the Congress
thought inequitable, regardless of the effect of the practices upon competition.
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ing prices, or protect buyers from deception. We recognize the need for laws that
determine the plane of competition and the limits of permissible conduct. Such
legislation includes laws about working conditions and employment practices, food
and drug laws, and numerous other statutes as well as the equitable provisions of
the antitrust laws. In the aggregate, such laws divert competition from profitable
types of conduct that are considered objectionable to types of conduct that are
considered desirable or at least harmless. Like the laws of property and contract,
they constitute a part of the regulatory matrix within which competition takes
place. So far as they are self-consistent and intelligible, they necessarily imply,
though they do not explicitly set forth, conceptions of the functions that competition
can perform satisfactorily, the functions for which it is not effective, and the com-
petitive conduct that is appropriate to the former functions. Thus they are relevant
to the competitive policy. Indeed, ill-considered equitable laws can thwart desirable
competitive conduct, and excessive scope for equitable laws could attenuate competi-
tion to the point where a regulated economy replaced a competitive one.
But though equitable laws that are ill-conceived or excessive can impair competi-
tion, well-conceived ones can do little to maintain the vigor of competition. The
improvements in competitive results that are due to such laws spring from re-
pression of kinds of competition that are undesirable. Desirable kinds of competition
are not necessarily enhanced by such laws; they may be unaffected or may grow
stronger or weaker as is appropriate to the underlying incentives and opportunities
to compete. If an adequate equitable code could be worked out, the activities of
big business might be kept "fair," but they could not be kept competitive by such
a code. Competitive innovations are novel, and hence cannot be described as fair;
competitive achievements may exceed not only what was thought fair but also
what was considered possible. Within limits set by society's concepts of fairness,
the function of competition is to induce what standards of fairness do not or cannot
require.
In spite of the relevance of equitable legislation to the competitive policy, such
laws lie beyond the scope of this essay. To analyze differing conceptions of the
proper functions of competition and regulation and to discuss the boundaries that
regulation might set for competitive conduct in the light of this analysis would
require an ambitious book. For present purposes, the antitrust laws will be
conceived as efforts to keep competition vigorous within the boundaries set by
equitable and other legislation, and discussion will be limited to the precautionary
controls over the activities of individual firms that have this purpose. The equitable
controls that are imposed in antitrust legislation will be considered only so far as
they affect this purpose.
Moreover, the discussion of precautionary controls will be limited to the Clayton
Act. The conclusions to which I am led by this discussion would not be sig-
nificantly altered by the longer and more complex analysis that would be necessary
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if the diverse precautionary applications of the Federal Trade Commission Act were
also discussed.
IV
The precautionary controls adopted in 1914 in the Clayton Act, and later extended
in the Robinson-Patman Act and the Celler-Kefauver Act,27 are incomplete sub-
stitutes for a policy designed to keep the structure of markets sufficiently decentral-
ized that markets can be self-adjusting. They do not impose structural correctives
where market structure is now inconsistent with vigorous competition. Neither
do they grapple directly with the phenomena of sticky prices, meaningless product
differentiation, wasteful planned obsolescence, de facto control of distributors by
suppliers, and impairment of consumer choice by excessive promotional effort, by
which defective competition often manifests itself. Instead, on the implied premise
that existing business, so far as it does not violate the Sherman Act, is adequately
competitive, they merely attempt to prevent future reduction of competition by for-
bidding activities that are likely to have competition-reducing effects. Such a policy
is inadequate to the extent of the inadequacy of its premise that the Sherman Act
can cope with all significant existing impairments of competition.
Within their own modest limits, however, these precautionary controls have an
important function to perform-to make sure that the prospects of competition
shall grow no worse. They can perform this function satisfactorily only if (a)
activities that tend to reduce competition can be identified and prevented without
substantial damage to activities that have no such tendency and (b) prevention
of the anticompetitive activities is sufficient to forestall an anticompetitive trend in
industrial organization.
Attempts, like those of the Clayton Act, to control business conduct in order to
prevent the lessening of competition assume (a) that reduction of competition is a
result of specified kinds of conduct, (b) that this result is not invariable, and (c)
that it can nevertheless be foreseen with reasonable accuracy by examining the con-
ditions under which the conduct takes place. The first assumption is not tenable
so far as the results of conduct are indeterminate or depend upon the interaction of
an indeterminate number of different types of behavior or consist of an indissoluble
blend of reductions of competition in some respects and enhancements of it in
others. To accept this assumption one must presuppose that the types of conduct
that are specified have characteristic one-sided results, either invariably or under
particular circumstances. If this is true, conduct with invariable anticompetitive
consequences can be categorically forbidden; a conditional prohibition of it would
presuppose that this effect is not inevitable. Such a conditional prohibition would
be futile if the circumstances that determine the anticompetitive effect would not
be detected soon enough to avert it. The Congress that enacted the Clayton Act
T 64 Stat n125 (195o), z5 U.S.C. § x8 (z964).
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failed to identify any kind of business conduct that was so invariably anticompetitive
as to be forbidden under all circumstances. It eventually devised only four pro-
hibitions. Of these, one was made applicable only to competing corporations larger
than a specified size. The other three were made applicable in circumstances, not
further defined, in which their probable effect would be a substantial lessening of
competition or a tendency toward monopoly. After half a century of experience
and two substantial amendments, the law's precautionary provisions have the same
orientation 2
V
In the Clayton Act, as amended, the significant precautionary provisions are the
curbs upon price discrimination,2 9 exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, 3°
and corporate acquisitions of stock or business assets.8 l (The act's additional sub-
stantive provision that seeks to preclude personal links between competing corpora-
tions through common directors was so badly devised that it may be ignored as
meaningless82)
A. Tying Arrangements
In the case of tying arrangements, the conditions requisite for precautionary
control of conduct have been present. A seller cannot undertake to condition the
sale of one product, or the offer of it at a low price, upon a requirement that the
purchaser also buy another, unless he has a substantial degree of control over the
supply of the first; and he will seldom do so for any purpose other than to foreclose
S8 In the 19X4 law, acquisitions of stock were made illegal if they probably would reduce competition
either in the market or among the corporations involved in the acquisition. The 195o amendment
eliminated the latter test. In the Robinson-Patman Act, transmission of brokerage from a party on one
side of a transaction to a party on the other was made illegal under all circumstances; promotional
payments and promotional services by a seller were made illegal if disproportional among his com-
peting customers; and price discrimination was made illegal not only when likely to impair market
competition but also when likely to reduce the competitive opportunities of those discriminated against.
These features of the act reflect its equitable purposes, not its precautionary ones.
" Sec. 2, as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (x964).
8 Sec. 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
"
1Sec. 7, as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § I8 (x964).
"s Sec. 8 of the act, 38 Stat. 732 (194), as amended, 49 Stat. 7M7 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § ig (1964),
applying to interlocking directorates between competitors, was so badly drafted that evasion of its
purpose is easy. Since the prohibition is not addressed to the corporation but only to the particular
person who has a dual directorship, an order that terminates the illegal relationship applies to the
offending person alone and not to another person who may succeed him in the same dual capacity.
There is a serious question whether such an order can be stretched to forbid the competing corporations
to employ such a successor. Moreover, though the law applies to interlocking directors, it does not
explicitly apply and has not been extended by interpretation to apply to interlocking corporate officers
nor to an interlock between a directorship in one company and an office in another nor to employment
of the principal stockholder of one company as officer or director of another. Neither does it forbid
the boards of directors of competing companies from being linked by brother and brother, husband and
wife, father and son, partners in legal or accounting or advertising firms, or different directors of the
same bank or the same corporate supplier or customer. Because of these weaknesses, violation of the
law is not necessary to establish a personal bond between corporations; and, where violation does occur,
enforcement of the law cannot accomplish significant results.
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the opportunity of those who compete with him in selling the second. Thus an
anticompetitive tendency inheres in this practice, so much so that there would be
only occasional irrelevance in forbidding it wholly. But since, except in periods of
acute shortage of goods, the practice can be adopted only under conditions in which
the supply of a commodity is under concentrated control, prohibition of it succeeds
only in preventing the spread of existing dominance from one commodity to an-
other. It does not prevent the initial attainment of dominance.
What the law accomplishes, however, is achieved without great difficulty. Since
the meaning of the law is clear and violations are not hard to detect, there is rela-
tively little violation. In such legal proceedings as arise, proof is not difficult, and
there is little need to disentangle harmful tying from harmless or useful tying.
The law accomplishes its limited precautionary purpose.
B. Price Discrimination
Experience with the law of price discrimination has given ground for doubt that
anticompetitive discrimination can be adequately identified, segregated, and pre-
vented wth adequate effect upon structural diffusion. The Robinson-Patman Act
has the purpose of preventing the use of price discrimination as a means by which
powerful sellers can selectively weaken their competitors and powerful buyers can
get buying advantages that are decisive in resale markets. Pursuit of this purpose
necessarily requires a choice between two interpretations of it: first, one in which
the objective is merely to preserve enough sellers and buyers to assure the vigor
of competition in markets at each successive level and, second, an interpretation in
which the objective is to prevent discrimination from depriving any substantial
number of sellers or buyers of opportunity to compete. Since the Robinson-Patman
Act has equitable as well as competitive goals, the latter interpretation has prevailed.
Though some of the difficulties that have developed are probably due to this
interpretation, the law has been unsatisfactory even under the first interpretation.
Discrimination that damages competition has been hard to distinguish from dis-
crimination that merely recognizes and reacts to the varying intensity of competition
in imperfect markets. For this reason, the law has handicapped sellers in respond-
ing flexibly to varying circumstances and has given rise to enduring controversy
about the proper limits of the right to discriminate in order to meet competition.
Discrimination that is an incident in the process by which price changes spread
has been hard to distinguish from discrimination that creates enduring competitive
advantages. For this reason the law has created hazards for those who try to drive
hard bargains. Discrimination sometimes produces mixed effects, enhancing
competition among oligopolistic sellers while diminishing it among their customers.
Under such circumstances, the law condemns the diminution and ignores the en-
hancement. Because of the law's inherent ambiguities, businessmen can now vary
their selling prices or haggle over buying prices only with caution and under legal
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guidance. Whether, on balance, the law has maintained more competition than
it has impaired is uncertain.
Moreover, discrimination is a complex phenomenon which the law may change
in form without eliminating. The likelihood of this result is greatest where enter-
prises are most powerful. A powerful seller, forbidden to divert trade from par-
ticular competitors by selectively reducing the price of one kind of goods in
particular parts of a market, can do so instead by making uniform price reductions
upon the part of its product-line that is most important to particular competitors.
A powerful buyer, deprived of discriminatory price concessions, can still obtain
special advantages in acquiring goods. It can (a) take a seller's entire output at
a low price; (b) obtain low prices from sellers who are meeting some other seller's
lawful competition; (c) buy goods cheaply abroad; (d) obtain low prices upon goods
so differentiated from what bears higher prices that the prohibition of the law is
inapplicable; (e) obtain goods of premium quality without paying a premium price;
(f) buy large amounts under long-term contract when prices are unusually low, or
(g) produce goods for itself. Powerful sellers can sometimes refuse to sell instead
of discriminating. Moreover, they and powerful buyers alike can resort to dis-
criminatory competition in sales expenditures: Powerful manufacturers can selectively
saturate parts of their markets with advertising and other promotional outlays, to
the detriment of their weaker rivals, so long as they do not do so in ways that dis-
criminate among their competing distributors. Instead of passing on discriminatory
price reductions to their resale markets, powerful chain stores can woo their cus-
tomers with longer and more varied lines of merchandise, free parking facilities, and
intensified advertising and can do so selectively in particular localities.
With possibilities such as these still open, the Robinson-Patman Act has been
a weak instrument with which to prevent whatever concentration of economic power
may result from discrimination. Its principal achievements have been equitable-
diminution of various inequalities in the terms of trade available to weak dis-
tributors. The degree of this achievement has tended to be greatest in eliminating
discriminations that were not very important to corporate empire-builders.
C. Exclusive Dealing
Experience with the law against exclusive dealing has also been unsatisfactory.
The purpose of the law is clear-to prevent arrangements that, by linking particular
sellers and buyers in exclusive (or preferential) relationships, prevent others from
competing for business with them. But, as in the case of the Robinson-Patman Act,
this purpose may have alternative interpretations: either to preserve the competitive
opportunities of the community of traders or merely to keep the number of traders
large enough to assure vigorous competition in the market. Choice between these
interpretations is not affected, as in the Robinson-Patman Act, by any statutory
announcement of a supplementary equitable goal.
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Whatever the interpretation, the appropriate scope of the law is not clear. An
exclusive arrangement may cover a large part of a market or a small one for a long
period of time or a short one. At its smallest and briefest, it may involve a restriction
of opportunity for others that is scarcely greater than that which is inevitable in
the sale or purchase of a substantial quantity of goods. The smaller the exclusive
arrangement relative to the total volume of the goods that is available or that is
customarily bought by the distributors of a particular market, the greater is the
probability that third parties will have access to adequate alternatives. The largest
and most enduring arrangements are the ones most likely to have preclusive effects.
But it is difficult to determine the degree of exclusiveness below which there is no
probability of an impairment of competitive opportunity.
Moreover, many exclusive arrangements are made not to deprive third parties
of access to the market but to provide an assurance of supply that will justify sub-
stantial expenditures for facilities or for promotion that would not otherwise be
profitable. In such cases, there is a possibility that competition between firms that
are parties to different exclusive arrangements will enlarge the total market without
significant damage to anyone's opportunity. To distinguish such situations from
those involving preclusion is not easy.
Most of the arrangements actually condemned have involved action by powerful
suppliers to establish enduring control over a considerable part of the country's
relevant distributive facilities, thus narrowing substantially the field that remained
open to independent suppliers. Condemnation of them has been appropriate to the
effort to diminish tendencies toward concentration. But the cases have been few and
their aggregate effect meager. Had they been numerous enough to have significant
aggregate meaning, the interpretative difficulties that are mentioned above would
probably have become formidable. Awareness of this probability by the law en-
forcement authorities appears to have been significant in reducing the number of
proceedings; even in the period between the Standard Stations case83 and the
Tampa Elec. case,84 when the authority of the Supreme Court appeared to support
the view that any exclusive dealing arrangement involving a substantial amount
of commerce was illegal, the many exclusive arrangements in the sale of auto-
mobiles, household appliances, and gasoline persisted with few legal challenges.
Any broad effort to apply the law about exclusive dealing to powerful firms
would be handicapped not only by the interpretative difficulties mentioned above
but also by the fact that this law, like the Robinson-Patman Act, can be circum-
vented. Vertical exclusiveness may be established, as a dissent in the Standard
Stations case indicated,, 5 by ownership as well as by contract. The law is not an
obstacle to vertical self-supply. Firms in the vertical line may be acquired, or, if
"' Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (949).
"
4 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (xg6x).
35 337 U.S. at 315-21.
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acquisition is blocked, an enterprise may expand vertically. By one method or the
other, a chain store may manufacture its private-branded goods, an oil company
may operate its own filling stations, and a large tire distributor may own molds in
which tires are produced for it from its own rubber by a large tire maker who
receives a processing fee. To forbid exclusive dealing by powerful firms is to in-
crease the incentives to create similar vertical structures.
VI
Except in the case of tying arrangements, the precautionary controls over market
behavior in the Clayton Act have achieved little and promise little as means to
prevent further growth of anticompetitive concentration. If they are used am-
bitiously, they necessitate decisions about the future effect of conduct upon competi-
tion that are not possible; hence it is uncertain whether they will preserve or impair
competition. If they are used modestly, they are unlikely to have sufficient effect to
counteract the development of an oligopoly. They may prevent a firm already
dominant in one field from extending its dominance into another by resorting to
the types of conduct to which the law applies, but are likely to result in use of some
alternative way of exerting dominant power that accomplishes the same business
purpose.
The law against mergers has substantially greater potential. It strikes directly
against concentration and is thus clearly pertinent to any reductions of competition
that might result from concentration. An effective version of it has been available
for only fifteen years, as compared with nearly thirty years for the Robinson-Patman
Act and more than fifty years for the provisions against exclusive dealing and tying.
The test cases that will determine its interpretation are still in progress. Never-
theless, it has already had preventive effects upon enhancement of concentration
in certain fields such as steel 6 and milk 3 and appears to be capable of similar
effects on a much wider scale.
The importance of this law is evident in the fact that acquisitions of some
business enterprises by others have contributed significantly to business concentra-
tion in the past and appear to be doing so now. The merger movement around the
beginning of this century was one of the developments by which oligopoly on a
national scale became an important aspect of American economic life.38 During
this period, some of today's largest companies attained by merger a place among the
country's dominant firms that they have not subsequently lost. As is illustrated by
the case of United States Steel Corp., leadership thus attained can give economic
8' United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
" See address of Willard Mueller, Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, "The
Current Merger Movement and Public Policy," before the Faculty of Business Administration, University
of Florida, Gainesville, Fla., May 16, 1963, pp. 9-x2 (mimeo.).
8 See RALpn L. NrLoN, MER E MovEaNrs N A M UCAN Inusry, 1896-1956, at 101-03
(1959); Hearings on Economic Concentration 13-15 (testimony of Gardiner C. Means).
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strength great enough to endure, though in diminished degree, through considerable
periods of gross inefficiency and laggard innovation39 The merger movement of
the 1920's, while less significant as a source of concentration, contributed substantially
to the vertical stretch and horizontal diversification of large companies.4" Since
i95o, significant numbers of important firms have disappeared by mergers, and the
country's largest and most powerful firms are conspicuous among those that made
the acquisitions.41  Many of the country's leading firms owe a substantial part of
their growth to mergers 2
The merger law can be used vigorously as a weapon against concentration
because its use is unlikely to entail social costs as high as those that might be involved
in a program of dissolution of large enterprises. Widespread dissolution might
deprive the larger firms of incentives to grow bigger and thus weaken their in-
centives to reduce prices and costs and to innovate. Widespread prevention of
mergers would leave such incentives intact except that the path to larger size would
be internal expansion instead of external acquisition. Moreover, wherever the
existing size of firms is requisite to economies of scale, a dissolution program could
be undertaken only at significant social cost, particularly since substantial scale
economies might be found to exist most frequently in oligopolistic firms that have
been developed as coherent business units. Similar problems of economy of scale
are likely to be encountered only seldom in preventing mergers, for the merging
firms were not designed to operate as single units and are not likely to operate as
such with the efficiency that a firm could attain by expansion. For a particular
enterprise, expansion by merger may be a quick way to expand and to attain what-
ever advantages may be derived from bigness. For the economy, it is an un-
promising way to build functionally efficient enterprises.
In forbidding any merger that probably will lessen competition substantially,
the amended merger law is applicable to all kinds of mergers, horizontal, vertical,
and conglomerate. Its application to horizontal mergers is directly relevant to
diminutions of competition by oligopoly such as have been discussed above. Its
39 See Hearings on H.R. 6679 Before the Subcomm. on Study of Monopoly Power of the House
Comm. on the judiciary, 8xst Cong., 2d Sess., see. 14, at 965 9f. (95o) (testimony of George W. Stock-
ing).
"
0Hearings on Economic Concentration X3-15 (testimony of Gardiner C. Means).
"'According to the Federal Trade Commission's chief economist, between $19 billion and $2o
billion of assets were acquired by merger from 1948 to x963, which amounted to 22% of the total
value of all corporate assets in manufacturing and mining for 1948, or 8% of that total for x963.
Firms that disappeared by merger included z 5 of the country's 0oo largest manufacturing corporations,
and 2x6 of the x,ooo largest. The merged manufacturing firms in the size class from $zo million to
$250 million of assets had aggregate assets equal to 20% of all assets possessed by firms in that size
class in 3963. As a group, the 200 largest manufacturers acquired 1869 firms with nearly $14 billion
in assets, including 82 of the largest i,ooo manufacturers. Their acquisitions equalled nearly 2/%
of the total assets they possessed in 1950, more than 8% of the total assets they possessed in 1962, and
nearly x6% of their total asset growth. For 23 of them, acquisitions exceeded 5o% of total asset
growth. See Hearings on Economic Concentration 123-29.
"See Hearings on Economic Concentration i6o-8r (testimony of Harrison Houghton, Assistant to
the Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission).
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application to vertical and conglomerate mergers is relevant to other aspects of
economic power about which we know less and differ more widely in opinion.
A. Horizontal Mergers
The need for vigorous action against anticompetitive horizontal mergers is
clear. Available information indicates that levels of concentration of a height that
often impairs vigorous competition exist in numerous industries and that, in a
significant number of these industries, high concentration has persisted or increased
for more than a decade. 3  This fact establishes the desirability of a merger policy
designed to deter anticompetitive horizontal concentration. The frequency and
trend of high concentration are relevant to an appraisal of the magnitude of the
effect that may be expected from prevention of horizontal mergers but not to the
need for precautionary action in the field where persistent high concentration exists.
In cases against horizontal mergers, the principal need is to develop, by amend-
ment of the law or by interpretation of it, legal and economic rules of thumb
capable of expediting the cases and enabling the enforcement agencies to cover
their field more adequately. The horizontal merger cases that have been actually
brought have involved chiefly relatively large mergers by relatively large national
firms. Where mergers are of this magnitude, it is clear that their prevention is
usually significant to the oligopoly problem. Though the present elaborate analyses
of relevant markets and competitive effects enhance the precision with which
merger policy is applied in such cases, this gain is obtained at great cost in delayed
decisions, fewer proceedings, and lack of voluntary compliance. Little would be
lost and much gained if we established rebuttable presumptions (a) that, for firms
that operate nationally, census five-digit product classes constitute relevant markets
and (b) that substantial lessening of competition would be probable if such a firm
were a party to a merger after which the merged firm controlled a stated sig-
nificant portion of the total supply. The force of the second presumption could
be enhanced if parties to a merger who undertook to rebut it were required to show
that the merger probably would be not merely harmless to competition but actually
beneficial to it. Under such a rule, the parties to a merger would carry the burden
of proving that the definition of the market was clearly wrong or that a market
share greater than the stipulated percentage was necessary to preserve the existence
of a failing firm, to enable the merging companies to compete effectively against
a much larger firm, or otherwise to preserve or enhance competition. If the practical
a High levels of concentration in 1958 are summarized in Hearings on Economic Concentration 89,
for major industries, and id. at 325 for all industries. For changes in concentration in industries, see
id. at 67-68, 75, 127, 325, and 447. The figures about change show change both ways, with decreases
more numerous than increases. For antitrust policy, however, the significant fact is that there have
been increases in numerous industries, including some major ones and some, both major and minor,
that have high concentration ratios. The extent of the condition is relevant not to the need for corrective
action but to the proportion of the economy in which the need arises.
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effect were that the major national firms undertook almost no mergers with com-
petitors, this result would be desirable.
If some such rule of thumb were to be applied, cases would arise to which the
rule was only partly applicable or not applicable at all. Relevant territorial markets
would need to be determined for firms of less than national scope, but, within such
markets, five-digit product groups could be regarded as presumptively appropriate
measures of the market's product extension. In addition, market shares equivalent
to those used in the nationwide formula could be treated as presumptive indications
of anticompetitive effect. In particular instances, anticompetitive effects might be
probable from mergers involving a commodity group narrower than a five-digit
census classification or involving firms too small to attain the designated market
share by combination. In these cases, those who enforce the law would need to
e~tablish the scope of the relevant market and the nature of the anticompetitive
effects without the aid of presumptions. But failure to cover such situations compre-
hensively and adequately would be less important if limits to further growth by
merger had been set by presumptions like those that are here suggested.
A more difficult horizontal problem is raised by mergers of potential competitors.
In such cases, the effect of the merger upon competition depends upon two matters:
(a) the likelihood that actual competition will develop and (b) the competitive
stimulus that each company experiences from the mere possibility that the other
will become a competitor. Though the principle should be clear that mergers of
significant potential competitors should be forbidden, rules of thumb can do little or
nothing to simplify the application of it.
B. Vertical Mergers
Vertical mergers raise problems still more difficult. Since economic analysis
typically relates to simplified theoretical models in which producers deal directly
with consumers, economic theory has offered little guidance about the problems
that arise when production and distribution involve several successive levels of
activity. In the absence of a comprehensive vertical theory, a few starting points
for policy may be noted: (a) there is no obvious reason why the vertical boundaries
of enterprises should be set at any particular point; (b) there is considerable
persuasiveness in the idea that firms of different vertical dimensions should compete
with one another so that the viability of each type of structure would be tested by
competition; (c) there is reason to doubt that our policies toward close coordination
of activities at successive vertical stages of production and distribution should
differentiate, as they now do, between vertical control inherent in ownership and
vertical control established by requirements contracts or contracts for exclusive
dealing, and (d) there is reason to think that vertically, as well as horizontally,
efficient coordination of activities is more probable through coherent growth than
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through merger. So far as these four points have implications for policy toward
vertical mergers, the first two of them suggest a permissive attitude toward such
mergers, the last suggests a repressive one, and the third suggests merely that this
part of the merger law and the law of exclusive dealing should be harmonized.
In three situations the undesirability of vertical mergers seems clear. The first
is that in which a firm engaged in such a merger has a dominant position in a
horizontal field. Since, if such a firm acquires a place in a vertically related field,
it can use price squeezes, discrimination in orders or in supply of goods, and similar
tactics to extend this dominance vertically, it should not be allowed to consummate
vertical mergers. The second situation is that in which a horizontal field has been
oligopolized to the detriment of competition in the ways previously discussed and
competition in the field that one of the oligopolists proposes to enter by vertical
merger has not been similarly impaired by oligopoly. In this type of case, one
vertical merger is likely to lead to another with the result that anticompetitive
oligopoly spreads vertically. The third situation is that in which, by reason of
substantial difference in the horizontal extent of vertically related markets, a firm
not dominant in the wider market could by merger readily become dominant in the
narrower one because its resources were disproportionately large relative to other
firms in that market. Most of the cases in which vertical mergers have been
challenged seem to me to have involved such situations.
Except when associated with dominance or with oligopoly, however, foreclosure
of some part of a vertical market has dubious merit as a test of probable harm to
competition. Every vertical merger is likely to foreclose the parts of the related
markets that are common to the merged firms. Neither this fact nor the possibility
that certain similar vertical mergers may follow should be regarded as a demonstra-
tion of probable competitive injury if, after the mergers, each of the vertically
related markets remains sufficiently nonconcentrated to make vigorous competition
probable.
C. Conglomerate Mergers
The most significant and most difficult aspect of the merger law is probably
the prevention of anticompetitive conglomerate mergers. Most mergers in which
large enterprises now participate appear to be designed partly or wholly to extend
a line of products, to extend the sale of existing products into new territory, or to
unite wholly unrelated activities.
Such mergers contribute to a concentration of control over economic life that
may have anticompetitive consequences. In manufacturing, the only segment of
the economy for which we have good estimates of concentration, a few firms now
occupy a large part of the total field. The largest fifty firms furnished in 1962
about twenty-four per cent of all value added by manufacturing, the largest ioo
firms furnished about thirty-two per cent, and the largest 2oo firms accounted for
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about forty per cent. Of all manufacturing assets, the largest fifty firms possessed
at least thirty-five per cent, the largest ioo at least forty-five per cent, and the largest
200 about fifty-five per cent. Of manufacturing profits after taxes, the largest fifty
received nearly forty-eight per cent, the largest ioo nearly fifty-eight per cent, and
the largest 200 more than sixty-seven per cent.44 The available information indi-
cates that these percentages have grown substantially since the end of the second
World War.45
Much of the existing bigness of these big firms is due to the important place
that each has in one or more large industries, and a part of the recent enlargement
of their place in manufacturing has been due to the growth of their industries in
proportion to the rest of the economy. But, in general, the larger the firm, the
greater is the number of its plants and products. A substantial part of the bigness
of the big is due to diversification, and a substantial part of the increase in bigness
has been due to increase in diversification.40 The potential for further growth in
the relative size of the big companies consists chiefly in their capacity to diversify
still further.
Curbs upon growth by diversification are necessary lest manufacturing as a whole
be dominated by a few very large companies. The degree of over-all concentration
that seriously jeopardizes the economy is uncertain. But it is clear that beyond some
point further increase in the share of the economy controlled by a few large enter-
prises must impede competition. If, for example, the whole manufacturing economy
were controlled by fifteen firms, competition would suffer even if every firm were
engaged in every industry and if fifteen proved to be a number too large to
constitute restrictive oligopoly in the particular industries. Sources of goods, job
opportunities, innovations, and funds for expansion would be too few for the
survival of a competitive system. Entry into manufacturing by newcomers would
be impeded by the fact that a few enterprises with great resources controlled all the
existing facilities, employed all the experienced managers and technicians and all the
labor that had relevant skills, possessed all the relevant technology, and exerted
great influence upon the sources of materials, the channels of distribution, and the
capital markets. When the diversified fifteen firms competed with one another,
each would have available the possibility of subsidizing one activity from the
proceeds of another, striking where maximum damage could be inflicted with the
minimum commitment of resources, and forming alliances with others by reciprocal
"'Hearings on Economic Concentration 113-15 (testimony of Willard F. Mueller, Director, Bureau
of Economics, Federal Trade Commission); id. at 8o (testimony of John Blair).
"Responsible estimates indicate that the share of the largest 5o, ioo, and 200 corporations in total
value added by manufacture increased from 1947 to x962 by 7, 9, and to percentage points, re-
spectively; that their share in manufacturing assets increased from 195o to x962 by nearly 5, more
than 6, and nearly 8 percentage points, respectively. Comparisons for profits are not available. See
Hearings on Economic Concentration 8o-81, 12r.
"'Hearings on Economic Concentration 84-85 (testimony of John Blair); id. at 156-6o (testimony
of Harrison Houghton).
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trading. Each would also be exposed to similar strategies. Thus intense competition
would be peculiarly dangerous. Like great political states, the diversified fifteen
would be likely to temper their competitive pursuit of advantage in one of their
many fields of activity because each would know that vigorous warfare in one field
might lead to retaliation elsewhere and that the conflict might come to cover so
wide an area and require such a large commitment of resources as to be clearly
unprofitable.
The kind of danger to competition that has just been sketched is the cumulative
effect of excessive concentration by diversification. It is not the result of a particular
conglomerate merger but the aggregate effect of all of them. Since the field of
manufacturing is large, only the largest mergers could make, individually, more
than a slight change in the aggregate share of the largest companies. This fact,
plus the fact that the chance of increased efficiency by conglomerate merger is not
great, might suggest that the way to avert excessive conglomerate concentration is
to forbid all conglomerate mergers without regard to their individual effect.
But there are reasons to avoid such a policy, at least now. In some instances,
entry by a large established firm into an additional field of business may be the
most practicable or even the only practicable way to overcome obstacles to entry
and enhance competition in an oligopolized industry. In some instances, especially
in the case of relatively small companies that diversify by market extension or
product extension, diversification may enhance efficiency by making possible a
volume of activity that permits economies of scale in the part of operations that
is common to the diverse markets, such as power supply, inspection and quality
control, or functionally specialized management. To allow for such possibilities,
conglomerate mergers should be prevented in the cases in which they individually
tend to reduce competition, and general repression of them should not be under-
taken unless it appears that the policy of selective repression is insufficient to stop
the concentrative trend.
The peculiarity of a conglomerate merger is that it diminishes the susceptibility
of a firm to the discipline of any one market, enhances the kind of power that can
be obtained from dispersion of resources, and enables a firm to attain greater aggre-
gate size. No coherent and generally accepted analysis of the significance of such
developments is yet available. In my opinion, however, the anticompetitive results
that are most likely to reflect the special characteristics of this kind of merger are
those that result from subsidization, reciprocity, full-line selling, and a "live-and-let-
live" attitude toward competition.47
'
T In 1958, about 24% of the total employment by the 2oo largest manufacturing companies fell
outside the 2-digit industry groups in which the firms were principally engaged. In 1962, the 1,ooo
largest manufacturing corporations included 728 that made shipments in more than 5 5-digit product
groups, 251 that did so in more than 15 such groups, and 15 that did so in more than 5o such groups.
Between 1950 and 1962, the number of firms with more than 5 product classes increased by 16o, of
firms with more than x5 product classes, by ioS, and of firms with more than 50 product classes, by 7.
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The opportunity to use subsidization as a competitive weapon is inherent in the
competition of a diversified firm with more specialized competitors. A diversified
firm can mobilize its liquid resources where it wishes and thus can afford to spend,
lose, or invest, in any one field, more than its operations in that field have made
available to it there. It is thus strengthened against the momentary limitations
that confront its specialized competitors. By diverting resources from other parts
of its operations, it can take fuller advantage of opportunities and is more capable
of withstanding temporary losses. In making decisions that involve risk, it can
therefore afford to be less cautious. It can use its advantage in mobility of resources
to discipline or harass specialized firms, and knowledge that it can do so is likely
to make them docile and responsive to its leadership. By allocating its joint
costs and overhead costs to the part of its business in which it encounters the least
competition, it can enduringly provide the equivalent of a subsidy to reduce its
costs of operation where its competitors are strongest. If its market structure and
its cost structure are both complicated, the costs of particular parts of its activity
may be so difficult to determine that subsidization becomes not a deliberate policy
but a "natural" response to competitive forces. But, whether consciously or un-
consciously, a diversified firm with heavy joint costs that allocates them in accord
with what the traffic will bear may reduce the competitive opportunity of its
specialized competitors in the lines of business in which its operations are thus
subsidized.
The opportunity to use reciprocity-that is, to insist that those who sell to a firm
shall also buy from it-is derived from the magnitude of a firm's purchases. When
the firm's size is increased by any means other than vertical integration, its purchases
increase and its ability to use such a policy increases also. When a large firm grows
bigger by conglomerate merger, it increases the volume of its buying and probably
also the diversity thereof. Its aggregate purchases from particular firms are likely
to increase, and so is the number of firms from which it makes substantial pur-
chases. If it relies on reciprocity in selling, its leverage for so doing is enhanced,
and the opportunity for its competitors to make sales is correspondingly reduced.
The opportunity to undertake full-line selling is increased by the type of con-
glomerate merger that extends the line of products. By joint promotion of the
various items in a line of products, a diversified firm can enhance its selling expenses
and increase the differential impact of them without increasing the sales cost per item
sold. It may be able to become more nearly the sole supplier of its distributive
outlets and may thus create difficulties for its competitors in obtaining comparable
cooperation from these outlets. It may attain a sufficient volume of related goods
to enable it to integrate vertically instead of using independent distributors and may
See Hearings on Economic Concentration 157, 159, 388. See also id. at 41-45 (testimony of Corwin
D. Edwards).
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either do so or use the possibility of doing so as leverage in its dealings with the
independents.
A "live-and-let-live" approach to competition may arise between two or more
great diversified firms long before conglomerate concentration has made this attitude
characteristic of most big business. As rivals in many markets, such competitors
may think it wise to consider the effect of competition at any one point upon the
nature of their competitive relationship at many other points. Each may be aware
that the other is a formidable competitor because of its resources, its power to sub-
sidize, and its ability to retaliate in the particular fields most important to its rival
and least important to itself. Each may envisage price competition as something
likely to spread from market to market, with aggregate losses that probably would
outweigh any localized gains. Where such ideas acquire force, they may lead
to informal reciprocal recognition of each firm's primary interest in particular fields
of activity in a way similar to that by which national states sometimes avoid con-
flict by reciprocally recognizing spheres of influence.
D. Conclusions on Antimerger Policy
The potential of the antimerger policy is not yet clear. It depends partly, but
not wholly, upon how the law is interpreted and how vigorously it is administered.
In over-all impact, however, the effect of the policy depends upon the question
whether it can affect the relation between the rate of growth of big business and
the rate of growth of the economy. If the economy grows faster than big business,
this fact will necessarily tend to reduce the aggregate anticompetitive effects that
may now be created by oligopolies and by vertical and conglomerate concentration.
The inadequacy of the Sherman Act to cope with such phenomena will decrease in
importance. The present laws will become increasingly adequate for their purpose.
Their localized failures will be unlikely to become more numerous and important.
If the economy and big business grow at about the same rate, as some observers
say has been true for about two-thirds of a century, our economic expansion will
provide no general mitigation of antitrust difficulties. The problems that concentra-
tion now creates will remain with us unless we devise new solutions for them.
But if, in spite of the antimerger policy, the growth of big business outruns the
growth of the economy, drastic changes in antitrust policy probably will become in-
evitable.
